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ONLY WORDS. By Catharine A. MacKinnon. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 1993. Pp. v, 152. $14.95. 
Professor Catharine MacKinnon's1 short book, Only Words, has 
already produced a flurry of reactions. Only a few who have reviewed 
the book, which sets out MacKinnon's theoretical framework for her 
campaign against pornography, have treated it, or MacKinnon, 
kindly. Most have been unabashed in their criticism. Judge Richard 
Posner in the New Republic, for example, labels her "reckless."2 In 
the Nation, Carlin Romano closes his review, in which he invites the 
reader to follow along as he fantasizes raping MacKinnon, 3 by calling 
her an "authoritarian in the guise of a progressive."4 Ronald Dwor-
kin's review in the New York Review of Books, while generally respect-
ful, spells MacKinnon's first name Catherine rather than Catharine5 
and includes on the opening page a caricaturized drawing of the pro-
fessor with crossed arms and pursed lips, topped with a wild tornado 
of voluminous hair.6 
Moreover, many of the criticisms reviewers have leveled are gender 
biased. For instance, Calvin Woodard states that the arguments Mac-
Kinnon employs in Only Words come merely from a woman sounding 
"a heartbreaking cry for help."7 At the same time, however, her 
blunt, aggressive writing seems to have invaded a rhetorical space tra-
ditionally reserved for the words of men. Woodard, for example, la-
bels MacKinnon "militant,"8 apparently unbothered by any 
inconsistency in his characterizations. Carlin Romano gets on the 
bash-MacKinnon-because-she-is-acting-like-a-man bandwagon when 
he laments that "precisely because of her star power, MacKinnon 
can't be laughed off. She's the lead commando in a legal phalanx 
•••• "
9 Still another reviewer uses her allotted page in the Village 
Voice to muse about the possible sexual nature of MacKinnon's rela-
tionship with the recently newsworthy Jeffrey Masson.10 The com-
1. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
2. Richard A. Posner, Obsession, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1993, at 31, 34. Judge Posner 
also complains that the book contains "no nuance, qualification, measure or sense of propor-
tion." Id. at 31. 
3. Carlin Romano, Between the Motion and the Act, NATION, Nov. 15, 1993, at 563, 563. 
4. Id. at 570. 
5. Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography. N.Y. REV. OF Bo01cs, Oct. 21, 1993, at 36, 
36. 
6. Id. 
7. Calvin Woodard, Speak No Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, § 7 (Book Review), at 11, 12. 
8. Id. at 12. 
9. Romano, supra note 3, at 564. 
10. See Mim Udovitch, Imagine That, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 25, 1994, at 19 ("I like men 
who have both [ideas and erections], preferably men who are capable of having more than one of 
1943 
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bined implication seems to be that we should not take MacKinnon's 
legal critiques seriously because she is a helpless commando who has a 
lot of sex. 
Why the hostility? Why do these reviews read more like reactions 
than engagements? Did MacKinnon anticipate, or in fact even invite, 
this sort of response? To answer these questions, I should first outline 
what her book does. 
The mere 110 pages of text divide into three parts. In the first part, 
titled "Defamation and Discrimination," MacKinnon attempts to link 
the production and consumption of pornography to a host of social sex 
inequalities, including rape and sexual harassment (pp. 3-41). Por-
nography, according to MacKinnon, creates these inequalities, at least 
indirectly: "Pornography does not leap off the shelf and assault wo-
men. Women could, in theory, walk safely past whole warehouses full 
of it, quietly resting in its jackets. It is what it takes to make it and 
what happens through its use that are the problem" (p. 15). 
This cause-and-effect relationship between pornography and sex 
inequality motivates MacKinnon's project, yet some writers still doubt 
its empirical validity. Ronald Dworkin, no newcomer to the debate 
about pornography and free speech, 11 has gone so far as to assert that 
"no reputable study has concluded that pornography is a significant 
cause of sexual crime: many of them conclude, on the contrary . . . 
that desire for pornography is a symptom rather than a cause of 
deviance."12 
Perhaps because she recognizes that the causal link remains, in 
legal parlance, a disputed issue of fact, 13 she lends her claim intellec-
tual, if not empirical, force by relying on modern speech-act theory. 
Pornography, MacKinnon claims, is more than allusive; it does things: 
"Its place in abuse requires understanding it more in active than in 
passive terms, as constructing and performative rather than as merely 
referential or connotative" (p. 21; footnote omitted). 
This strategy is clever, and MacKinnon correctly identifies 
J.L. Austin's How To Do Things with Words as the "original enuncia-
both. (And from what one reads by and about Jeffrey Masson, that's the kind Catharine Mac-
Kinnon's got.)"). 
11. A 1981 article by Dworkin, for example, provides an extremely readable account of the 
numerous concerns at play in this debate. See Ronald Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornogra-
phy?, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177 (1981). 
12. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 38. 
13. MacKinnon might fruitfully draw. here on the growing body of feminist science sug-
gesting that, at its core, Western scientific inquiry grows out of and reinforces sex bias. See, e.g., 
SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? (1991). In other words, if social 
science as we now experience it fails to find an empirical link between pornography and sex 
crime, the failure might indicate an inability of the scientific method rather than an absence of an 
actual link. Given this possible failing of science, anecdotal evidence of a connection - the very 
kind MacKinnon employs - might be the best we can rely on in ascertaining the relationship of 
pornography to behavior. 
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tion of the theory of performative speech."14 A useful exploration of 
what pornography does, however, in all its various modes of produc-
tion, commerce, and consumption, would require a more textured un-
derstanding of speech-act theory than the streamlined account 
MacKinnon gives in Only Words. Although the paradigmatic speech 
act - a minister's pronouncing a couple man and wife or a jury's 
finding a defendant guilty - is easily understood as an act in addition 
to an utterance, pornography pushes the bounds of the paradigm. For 
example, the only utterances. in pornography are usually written down 
or taped on film or videocassette. Thus, the performer of the alleged 
speech act is rarely in the presence of his or her audience, the obvious 
exception being the case of live sex shows. Can "speech" in such a 
circumstance be or have the effect of a speech act? That is, are speech 
acts iterable? If I want to marry Jane Doe, can I play a recording of a 
minister proclaiming us to be married, or would the performance of 
marriage require the minister's presence? 
Questions such as these have spawned a significant literature build-
ing on and critiquing Austin's ideas, particularly focusing on the prob-
lem of iterability of performative speech. Jacques Derrida, for 
instance, has observed "the possibility for every performative utter-
ance (and a priori every other utterance) to be 'quoted.' " 15 Austin, 
however, considered reiterated speech acts hollow, void: "[L]anguage 
in such circumstances [of reiteration] is in special ways - intelligibly 
- used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use .... 
All this we are excluding from consideration."16 To Derrida, Austin's 
bracketing of this crucial element of performative speech - its iter-
ability - renders the Austinian version of speech-act theory flawed, or 
at least incomplete.17 If Derrida is correct and Austin's description of 
the performative does not seek to explain the nature and effects of 
reiterated speech, then where is the Austinian performative speech in 
pornography? Who is saying what to whom and in what context? 
This all is not to say that the "speech" in pornography does not create 
inequality; the discussion merely suggests that MacKinnon needs to 
look beyond Austin if she hopes to describe accurately the mecha-
nisms by which pornography "performs" its dirty work.18 
14. P. 21 n.31 (citing J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962)). 
15. JACQUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC l, 16 (Gerald Graff ed., 
Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 2d ed. 1990). 
16. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 22. 
17. See DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 17 ("For, ultimately, isn't it true that what Austin ex-
cludes as anomaly, exception, 'non-serious,' citation (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the 
determined modification of a general citationality - or rather, a general iterability - without 
which there would not even be a 'successful' performative?" (footnote omitted)). 
18. Consider, in this light, an example of harm MacKinnon attributes to pornography: "In 
pornography, women are gang raped so they can be filmed." P. 15. Speech-act theory sheds 
little light on the mechanism by which this harm occurs. What is the speech here and what is it 
doing? Speech-act theory might help to explain, for instance, why the video broadcast of the 
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MacKinnon's vivid description of pornography and its effects19 
suffers from another weakness as well: it fails to address the potential 
harm of pornography to men. 20 That is, perhaps male consumers of 
pornography also suffer by their exposure to it. The damage to men 
would be of a different sort than the damage to women; it would be a 
degradation and corruption of men's views of sexuality, and perhaps, 
the argument might go, the law should discourage activity or com-
merce that corrupts and degrades. According to Ronald Dworkin, 
this argument grows out of 
the hypothesis that humans will develop differently and in fact best, and 
find the most suitable conditions for their own flourishing, if their law 
cultivates an ennobling rather than a degrading attitude towards their 
sexual activity by prohibiting, even in private, practices that are in fact 
perversions or corruptions of the sexual experience.21 
To be sure, arguing that pornography hurts men would be secondary 
to the thrust of MacKinnon's argument - that pornography creates 
sex inequality - but such an argument might be useful from a strate-
gic standpoint. Given that Only Words has been described, perhaps 
unfairly, as "radiat[ing] the kind of hostility, resentment and contempt 
toward men that MacKinnon skewers men for expressing toward wo-
men,"22 MacKinnon would benefit by at least acknowledging the in-
terest men might have in ensuring the success of her campaign.23 
Regardless of these shortcomings, the first part of the book effec-
tively performs its intended function. It recasts the reality of what 
pornography does - or at least what MacKinnon says it does - and 
contrasts that with what First Amendment law thinks pornography 
says: 
gang rape has a particular effect on someone; it does not help disentangle the harms intrinsic in 
the production of pornography from the speech doctrine that protects the finished product. 
19. See, e.g., p. 19 ("Sooner or later, in one way or another, the consumers want to live out 
the pornography further in three dimensions. Sooner or later, in one way or another, they do."). 
20. I am not speaking here about gay male pornography, which - at least according to John 
Stoltenberg, a compatriot of both MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin - also finds its roots in 
misogyny and perpetuates sex inequality by eroticizing sexual dominance. See generally John 
Stoltenberg, Gays and the Pornography Movement: Having the Hots for Sex Discrimination, in 
MEN CoNFRONT PORNOGRAPHY 248 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1991). Stoltenberg reasons that 
gay pornography, because it calls upon the same vocabulary as straight pornography, reinforces 
misogyny, which in turn perpetuates homophobia. 
21. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 189. 
22. Romano, supra note 3, at 564. 
23. On the other hand, such a gesture might undermine MacKinnon's pungent rhetorical 
strategy of addressing the book to the individual female reader. She begins the first page with an 
imperative: "Imagine ... [y]ou grow up with your father holding you down and covering your 
mouth so another man can make a horrible searing pain between your legs." P. 3. In case the 
reader glosses over this syntactic slap, MacKinnon reiterates the point, using you or your a total 
of 30 times on the first page alone. She thus forces even male readers to participate in her 
imagined reality. If she were later to make a separate nod to any potential male readers, she 
would undermine the power and universality of her initial command that each of us envision 
himself or herself as suffering the harms pornography visits upon women. 
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In ... the approach of current law, pornography is essentially treated 
as defamation rather than as discrimination. That is, it is conceived in 
terms of what it says ... rather than in terms of what it does. Funda-
mentally, in this view, a form of communication cannot, as such, do any-
thing bad except offend. [p. 11; footnote omitted] 
This reconception of pornography as something that does something 
in addition to saying something is critical to the antipornography 
movement. Without it, pornography remains protected expression. 
Having presented her argument for a reconception of pornography 
in Part I, MacKinnon returns to safer ground in Part II, titled "Racial 
and Sexual Harassment" (pp. 43-68). Her purpose here is to bolster 
the arguments in Part I, or at least make them more palatable, by 
immersing the reader in an area of law and life in which words have 
long been viewed as acts: "If ever words have been understood as acts, 
it has been when they are sexual harassment .... Only words - yet 
they have not been seen as conveying ideas ... " (p. 45). MacKinnon 
attempts to show how absurd it would be to characterize behavior we 
now label as harassment as expression worthy of constitutional protec-
tion. 24 With the harms of pornography fresh in the memory from Part 
I, the reader, MacKinnon hopes, will see that pornography is really 
just like harassment, and so protection of pornography is just as ab-
surd as would be protection of harassment. 
This strategy - showing that pornography is identical in relevant 
respects to something the law already prohibits - is really just an 
instance of traditional analogical reasoning; it is like saying, "Pornog-
raphy is more like harassment than speech, so we should treat it like 
harassment." Given the traditional method of this element of Mac-
Kinnon's argument, it seems odd to read Judge Posner maligning the 
book as "a verbal torrent that appeals ... to elemental passions (fear, 
disgust, anger, hatred) rather than to the rational intellect."25 The 
strategy, to the contrary, displays just the sort of reasoning law profes-
sors hope to impart to their students through the case method and 
analysis of hypothetical fact patterns. 
Despite its appeal, simplicity, and traditional structure, however, 
the analogical argument may not be strong enough alone to support a 
wholesale shift in the regulation of pornography. In the first place, 
Title VII creates a civil cause of action to counter only workplace har-
assment. 26 A woman targeted for sexual harassment on the street or 
24. For example, she observes: 
The workplace comment "Black women taste like sardines" has not been construed as a 
possible advertisement for fish, hence protected commercial speech .... When a man slips a 
woman's paycheck into his pants and requires her to "go for it," nobody suggests he is 
making a militant display of dissent against the economic system. 
P. 47 (footnote omitted). 
25. Posner, supra note 2, at 31. 
26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67, 73 (1986) (recognizing a cause of action 
for workplace harassment under Title VII). 
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in the home remains, according to the law, merely offended, notwith-
standing that nonworkplace harassment probably also contributes to 
sex inequality. Thus, if we were to treat pornography as we treat har-
assment, where would we prohibit it? Everywhere? Only where wo-
men's equality matters most? 
The analogical argument also falters because it unfairly underes-
timates the force of expressive concerns in the debate regarding just 
how far antiharassment regulation should go. MacK.innon admits 
that courts are now considering the extent to which campus speech 
codes, for instance, impinge on speech rights.27 However, she never 
directly faces the implications of the growing concern over the conflict 
between harassment law and speech law for her analogical argument. 
If the judicial and academic trend is to pay increasing attention to the 
expression suppressed by harassment law, then MacK.innon might 
want to rethink whether she really wants the law to treat pornography 
the same way it treats harassment. 
These criticisms, however, are really no more than quibbles. The 
question MacK.innon asks - Why should we treat pornography more 
like speech than harassment? - is valid. From an ahistorical stand-
point, it has no compelling answer. Of course, MacKinnon does know 
how legal protection of pornography developed historically: 
In America, the examples that provide the life resonance of the expres-
sive freedom, the backdrop of atrocities for the ringing declarations, de-
rive mostly from attempts to restrict the political speech of communists 
during the McCarthy era. . . . The story of the First Amendment is an 
epic story of overcoming that, of progress, of making sure it never hap-
pens again. [pp. 74-75] 
Thus, she argues in Part III - "Equality and Speech" - that First 
Amendment doctrine has developed an unwarranted obsession with 
protection of speech that is in one way or another unpopular (pp. 71-
110). She labels this obsession the" 'speech you hate' test .... You 
can tell you are being principled by the degree to which you abhor 
what you allow" (p. 75). 
MacKinnon argues in this last part of her book, however, that our 
experiences with McCarthyism need not be the only historical back-
drop against which we develop our First Amendment doctrine. 
Equally important, if not more so, are the values embodied in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. MacK.innon 
rightfully wonders why modern speech doctrine, which postdates the 
Fourteenth Amendment, largely ignores equality concerns.28 For 
27. The potential conflict between speech rights and workplace harassment law is beginning 
to receive scholarly attention as well. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech 
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). 
28. See, for example, p. 71: 
[T]he First Amendment has grown as if a commitment to speech were no part of a commit-
ment to equality and as if a commitment to equality had no implications for the law of 
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instance, the state protects nude dancing as speech, yet nude dancing 
arguably contributes to sex inequality by exposing women to harms 
because of their sex. If so, the Constitution might require the state to 
recognize that the equality guarantee limits or even trumps the alleged 
speech right protecting the dancing. 29 Our Constitution is, as Mac-
Kinnon notes, "a document that accepts balancing among constitu-
tional interests as method" (p. 84). In suggesting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment might provide limits on speech rights independent of 
those deriving from the First Amendment itself, MacKinnon performs 
once again her classic move. Just as she has done with so many other 
legal issues, 30 she recasts pornography as an instance of sex inequality. 
Of course, even MacKinnon accepts that in a true balancing of 
interests, equality might not always win.31 All she wants is a "fair 
fight ... between equality and speech as two constitutional values" (p. 
85). This request is really quite modest, especially when posed to her 
adversaries who presumably incant the "marketplace of ideas" man-
tra. Reviewers, however, have balked at the idea of exposing First 
Amendment freedoms to equality scrutiny. Ronald Dworkin, for in-
stance, worries that "the frightening principle that considerations of 
equality require that some people not be free to express their tastes or 
convictions" could lead to government censorship of any material that 
"might reasonably offend a disadvantaged group. "32 Even though 
speech - as if the upheaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not move 
the ground under the expressive freedom, setting new limits and mandating new extensions, 
perhaps even demanding reconstruction of the speech right itself. 
Id. . 
29. It might also be proper to question whether affirmative state protection of behavior that 
works an inequality on a protected group also works an "expressive harm" on that group. Cf. 
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Biza"e Districts," and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 
506-07 (1993) ("An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed 
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the 
action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as 
what the action does."). In other words, even if First Amendment doctrine would argue for 
protection of a certain form of expression, resonances from governmental failure to protect the 
targets of that expression might nevertheless militate against protection. 
30. MacKinnon has argued that the law should view a number of topics through the lens of 
sex inequality and treat laws that affect these topics as governed by the Equal Protection Clause. 
Among these topics are rape, see. e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality 
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301 (1991) ("Women are sexually assaulted because they are 
women: not individually or at random •... "); reproduction, see, e.g., id. at 1309 ("[W]omen, 
because of their sex, are subjected to social inequality at each step in the process of procrea-
tion."); homosexuality, see, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE 248 (1989) (arguing that in a world viewed through a sex equality lens, "[g]ay and 
lesbian rights would be recognized as sex equality rights"); and sexual harassment, see, e.g., 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED 103, 109 (1987) (stating that "sexual harassment is sex-based discrimination"). 
31. For instance, in imagining how her constitutional scheme might play out in the courts, 
she reckons that "pornography ordinances and hate crime provisions fail constitutiopal scrutiny 
that they might, with constitutional equality support, survive." P. 85. 
32. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 40. 
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Dworkin overstates MacKinnon's argument, 33 his fear of what 
government might do with this equality-justified license to censor may 
not be wholly unfounded. The Canadian Supreme Court, for instance, 
has upheld laws restricting hate propaganda34 and obscenity, 35 relying 
largely on equality principles. The repercussions of these decisions, 
however, may not be identical to those for which MacKinnon and 
others had hoped. One opinion piece in the New York Times has 
noted that MacKinnon has become the target of widespread anger 
among Canadian artists, writers, and activists.36 Apparently, Cana-
dian authorities have used the terms "degrading and dehumanizing" 
- terms lifted straight from the judicial opinion MacKinnon champi-
ons in Only Words as a victory for women - to justify seizing lesbian, 
gay, and feminist material and fining a bookstore owner for selling a 
lesbian magazine. 37 
These acts of censorship and harassment might demonstrate the 
danger of misapplying MacKinnon's vision of an equality-tempered 
speech right, but they do not prove the theory is flawed. Presumably, 
MacKinnon would argue that Canadian heterosexuals were not at risk 
of sexual abuse and assault as a result of the sale of lesbian literature. 
Thus, those who found the materials degrading - nonlesbians - were 
not deserving of equality protection, for "[i]n this new model, princi-
ple will be defined in terms of specific experiences, the particularity of 
history, substantively rather than abstractly. It will notice who is be-
ing hurt and never forget who they are" (p. 109). 
With her argument that the constitutional equality guarantee 
should inform free speech doctrine, MacKinnon has brought the 
reader full circle, back to the opening pages of the book in which she 
attempts to link pornography to social inequality. The structure of the 
argument is simple: First, show that pornography harms women -
33. Throughout the book, MacKinnon makes clear that "offense" is neither her target nor 
her motivation. It seems unlikely then that she would ever approve a constitutional scheme 
whereby mere offense on the part of a member of a disadvantaged group would justify curtailing 
established First Amendment freedoms. The civil statute she and Andrea Dworkin drafted cre-
ated a civil cause of action through which women harmed through pornography could sue to 
"prove its role in their abuse, to recover for the deprivation of their civil rights, and to stop it 
from continuing." P. 92. Offense, under this statute, is not among the harms constituting a 
deprivation of civil rights. Ronald Dworkin's fear, therefore, may direct itself to a straw man 
argument. Admittedly, however, MacKinnon does occasionally appear dismissive of the value of 
speech rights. See, e.g., p. 108 ("Wherever equality is mandated, racial and sexual epithets, vilifi-
cation, and abuse should be able to be prohibited, unprotected by the First Amendment."). 
34. See Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
35. See Butler v. Regina, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.). 
36. Leanne Katz, Censors' Helpers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at 15. It would seem that 
almost everyone - conservatives, liberals, artists, writers, activists - opposes MacKinnon's an-
tipornography campaign. She does retain some powerful allies, however, including, apparently, 
Mother Nature. The vast majority of pornographic videos are produced in Southern California's 
San Fernando Valley - directly above the epicenter of the recent Northridge earthquake. X· 
rated Industry Is Disrupted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at Al 1. 
37. Katz, supra note 36, at 15. 
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that is, that it creates inequality. Next, show that pornography is simi-
lar to harassment, an issue the law already views as raising equality 
concerns. Finally, make a structural argument that the Constitution 
itself requires the law to examine pornography through an equality 
lens. This argument in itself does not appear particularly offensive, so 
we are still left with the question: Why have the reactions to the book 
and its author been so hostile? 
The answer must lie not in what the book says but in how it says it. 
Only Words does not read like a law review article. 38 Instead, Mac-
Kinnon takes every opportunity to display her rhetorical strengths. 
She knows and uses the emotional punch of sharply visual and visceral 
language. 39 This style is often riveting, always challenging. Occasion-
ally, however, the speed of MacKinnon's language seems to get the 
better of her. For instance, in an effort to force the reader to break out 
of a particular thought paradigm, she frequently simply pronounces 
that something is or is not something the reader probably never before 
thought it was or was not: "You find that the pictures, far from mak-
ing what happened undeniable, are sex .... " (p. 4). "What was words 
and pictures becomes, through masturbation, sex itself" (p. 25). 
These equivalences frequently seem to get caught in their own syntax 
and the point is lost: "In pornography, pictures and words are sex. 
At the same time, in the world pornography creates, sex is pictures 
and words. As sex becomes speech, speech becomes sex" (p. 26). "So-
called speech that works as a sex act is not an argument. An orgasm is 
not an argument and cannot be argued with" (p. 63). "When words of 
sexual abuse are in our mouths, that is pornography, and we become 
pornography because that is what pornography is" (p. 66). 
So what. My guess is that among the reasons MacKinnon chose to 
write Only Words as a book was to avoid the constraints student edi-
tors of law reviews impose on authors. The Michigan Law Review, for 
instance, would probably have required MacKinnon to footnote each 
of the equivalences quoted above. We would have advised her that her 
argument would be more accessible if she were to tone down some of 
her rhetoric. We would have asked her to provide readers early on 
with a roadmap to her piece, so as to guide the reader gently through 
her argument step by step. 
Only Words, however, is a book, not a law review article. That 
MacKinnon made the risky choice40 to write it in a discomforting 
38. With only 110 small pages of text and 192 endnotes, however, it is about the length ofa 
moderately sized law review article. 
39. See, e.g., p. 17 ("With pornography, men masturbate to women being exposed, humili-
ated, violated, degraded, mutilated, dismembered, bound, gagged, tortured, and killed .•.. The 
women are in two dimensions, but the men have sex with them in their own three-dimensional 
bodies, not in their minds alone. Men come doing this."). 
40. I claim that MacKinnon chose to write Only Words the way she did because, in compar-
ing this book with her other writings, it becomes obvious she can write in the traditional aca-
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style is to her credit. Moreover, books, as evidenced by this issue of 
the Michigan Law Review, get reviewed. They get attention. Only 
Words has received attention largely because of the way MacKinnon 
wrote it. She must have intended this. 
If so, then Catharine MacKinnon has pulled off something really 
quite clever. Her book, of course, is only words, yet it has incited 
unbridled anger and verbal abuse. Carlin Romano expressed his fury 
by imagining raping the professor. MacKinnon claims the publication 
of this fantasy actually raped her.41 Only words, yet look at the re-
sponses, look at the rage directed toward the professor. These re-
sponses and the anger and fear that lurk within them have in a sense 
become part of the text of Only Words; to read them is to read a part 
of what MacKinnon aimed to show. Like the pornography she hopes 
will someday reside only "in a glass case next to the dinosaur skeletons 
in the Smithsonian" (p. 110), MacKinnon's words have engendered 
real abuse, directed at her as a woman. In short, she has proved her 
point. 
- David C. Dinie//i 
demic mode. See, for example, her 1991 Yale Law Journal article: MacK.innon, Reflections on 
Sex Equality Under Law, supra note 30. She clearly knows how to write in a manner that gar-
ners critical approval. Telling is the newest paperback cover of Feminism Unmodified, which 
quotes a glowing review from the New York Times: '1Feminism Unmodified] is passionate, 
brilliant ••• [.] MacK.innon offers a systematic and persuasive perspective on issues that are 
central not only to feminism but to social theory in general." MAcKJNNON, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED, supra note 30, at front cover (quoting Alison M. Jaggar, Male and Female, Men and 
Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1987, § 7 (Book Review), at 3). 
41. Richard Lacayo, Assault by Paragraph, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 62. 
